The Genesis of the Crisis: Agent X and the BBC Investigation
The origins of the case trace back to the period before 2019, when a prominent, unnamed individual designated as “Agent X” operated as a Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS) for MI5, embedded deep within extreme right-wing networks (p. 12). In the summer of 2019, Daniel De Simone, a BBC home affairs journalist specialising in neo-Nazi extremism, began an independent investigation (p. 12). De Simone established Agent X’s true identity and discovered highly alarming material online suggesting that the individual was an exceptionally dangerous extremist (p. 12).
Concurrently, Agent X maintained a domestic relationship with a woman referred to in legal proceedings as “Beth” (p. 12). Beth alleged that Agent X seriously and persistently abused her (p. 12). Critically, Agent X boasted to Beth that he worked directly for MI5, explicitly claiming that this state affiliation rendered him “untouchable” by domestic law enforcement (p. 12).
On Friday 5 June 2020, De Simone emailed Agent X at his personal address, extending a formal “right of reply” (pp. 12, 32). The email informed Agent X that the BBC intended to broadcast an exposé identifying him by name and photograph as a dangerous neo-Nazi who promoted violent ideology online (pp. 12, 32-33).
Panic immediately engulfed Agent X’s regional MI5 handling section, consisting of his case handler (Officer 10), case controller (Officer 4), Operational Security Advisor (Officer 23), and an acting authorising officer (Officer 1) (pp. 32-33). The section rapidly drafted an operational risk assessment (p. 33). They recognised that while Agent X had only pursued neo-Nazi membership under explicit MI5 direction, a public broadcast would expose his real identity and, they claimed, put his life in immediate physical danger (p. 33).
The handling team recommended an extraordinary course of action: they proposed making a discreet approach to MI5’s confidential media contacts to “declare” Agent X’s true role as an active intelligence asset (p. 33). The objective was to persuade the BBC to pull or heavily censor the upcoming broadcast (pp. 33-34).
The Initial Breach: Officer 2 and the Calls to De Simone
Because MI5 lacks a formal public press office, interactions with journalists are tightly funnelled through a specialised media liaison team (p. 22). In June 2020, this team was headed by Officer 2, a long-serving, highly experienced former agent runner (pp. 9, 23, 31).
Before any contact with the BBC was initiated, an MI5 operational lawyer, Officer 7 (Legal), issued explicit legal advice regarding the stringent statutory parameters of departing from NCND (pp. 9, 36). Citing the Covert Human Intelligence Sources Revised Code of Practice, the lawyer emphasised that a departure from NCND could only occur in “exceptional circumstances” following a complex balancing exercise of public interests (pp. 36-37). Crucially, under MI5’s official, updated Media Engagement Policy of May 2019, any explicit departure from NCND required the express, written authority of the Director General (DG) or a Deputy Director General (DDG) (pp. 23-24). Furthermore, the policy mandated that the communications officer must make a full, immediate written record of the disclosure (p. 24).
The Goldring report documents a total failure to comply with these regulations (p. 18). High-level executive authorisation was never sought from the Director General or his deputies (pp. 12, 18). Instead, Officer 2 and the regional handling team treated the generalised legal advice as an operational “green light” (p. 38).
On Monday 8 June 2020, Officer 2 telephoned De Simone (pp. 13, 40). De Simone was not an established or trusted MI5 media asset (p. 13). Despite this, contemporaneous notes and subsequent voice recordings (taken by the BBC journalist) reveal that Officer 2 comprehensively abandoned NCND within the very opening minutes of the conversation (pp. 13, 16, 41). Officer 2 explicitly told the journalist: “What I’m about to tell you would (ordinarily) be illegal … One person is doing it on our behalf … He’s been asked to be (a member) by MI5” (p. 41).
Over a series of subsequent phone calls on 9, 10, and 11 June, Officer 2 proceeded to validate further details (p. 13). He claimed that Agent X had been “coached” by intelligence handlers to speak eloquently on right-wing ideologies and that everything the source had done was executed “at our behest” (p. 44). In a staggering expansion of the breach, Officer 2 used these calls to explicitly reveal to De Simone whether other individuals the journalist was researching were or were not active MI5 assets (pp. 13, 17).
Following these extensive disclosures, Officer 2 failed to write any formal contact note or log the outcome of the conversations (p. 13). This omission directly violated MI5 media protocols, guidance that Officer 2 himself had actively helped draft and execute just a year prior (pp. 13, 23, 30). Back at the regional office, the handling team understood that NCND had been cast aside (pp. 13, 19). Yet, they similarly failed to place an unequivocal entry into Agent X’s case file confirming that his status had been revealed to a BBC reporter (pp. 13, 19).
The Construction of the False Narrative (2021–2022)
For over a year, the BBC withheld publication while De Simone continued his investigation (p. 13). The crisis re-emerged on 6 December 2021, when De Simone sent a new email to MI5 (p. 13). He stated that the BBC was finalising a broadcast exposing Agent X as a dangerous extremist who had physically assaulted women and threatened the sexual abuse of children (p. 13). De Simone argued that Agent X’s horrific conduct was overt and easily discoverable, that MI5 knew or ought to have known about it, and that the state was deeply culpable for continuing to utilise him as an operative (p. 13).
Determined to block the broadcast on the professed grounds that it threatened life, the Attorney General, acting on behalf of MI5, applied for a sweeping High Court injunction in early 2022 (p. 14). Officer 3 had by this time succeeded Officer 2 as MI5’s Head of Communications (p. 14). He took a central role instructing government legal advisors (p. 14).
When drawing up witness statements, government lawyers required confirmation as to whether NCND had been maintained during the original 2020 interactions with the BBC (p. 14). Officer 3 interviewed Officer 2 regarding those past events (p. 14). Officer 2 claimed he could not entirely remember the specific details of the phone calls, but stated he “thought” he had not breached NCND (p. 14).
Rather than communicating this severe uncertainty to MI5’s legal counsel, Officer 3 actively sanitised the account (pp. 14, 19). He unequivocally told legal advisors that NCND had not been breached (pp. 14, 19). Officer 3 also spoke to the case controller, who explicitly indicated that NCND had not been maintained (pp. 14, 19). Officer 3 chose to suppress this warning, hiding it from government lawyers (pp. 14, 19).
Relying entirely on these distorted instructions, MI5 legal advisors drafted a formal, OPEN witness statement for the High Court (p. 14). The service selected Witness A, a senior Deputy Director, to serve as the corporate face of MI5 before the court (pp. 9, 14). Witness A had no direct personal involvement in the June 2020 events (p. 14). On 26 January 2022, Witness A signed and filed an OPEN statement containing the now-infamous Paragraph 11 (p. 14). It falsely and definitively stated under oath that during the 2020 conversations, Officer 2 had firmly upheld the principle of NCND (p. 14). This confirms a long-held suspicion that the intelligence agencies deliberately game the justice system by presenting witness evidence from operatives with no first-hand knowledge so that they can avoid lying.
The deception immediately faced pressure from “Special Advocates”, security-cleared external lawyers appointed to protect the BBC’s interests within secret, CLOSED court proceedings (pp. 11, 15). Upon reviewing Agent X’s unredacted case file, these advocates noticed glaring internal contradictions and twice formally challenged the assertion that NCND had been preserved (p. 15).
To counter this challenge, MI5 legal advisors convened a high-stakes meeting on 17 February 2022 with Officer 2 and Witness A (p. 15). During this meeting, Officer 2 shifted from his prior uncertainty and became entirely unequivocal, falsely claiming he had never departed from NCND (pp. 15, 18). Witness A added to the deception, stating he had spoken to the original handling team and possessed a “high degree of confidence” in the truth of his statement (p. 15). On 24 February 2022, MI5 delivered what Sir John Goldring termed a “wholly misleading and flawed response” to the Special Advocates, successfully shutting down their line of inquiry (pp. 15, 19).
Deceived by the state’s unified narrative, the High Court granted a permanent injunction in October 2022, shielding Agent X’s identity (p. 15).
The Escalation: Defying Watchdogs and the IPT (2023–2024)
In May 2022, Agent X’s domestic abuse victim, Beth, launched a human rights claim against MI5 before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), asserting that the agency had knowingly failed to protect her from a violent operative (p. 15). MI5 attempted to bolster its defence by emphasising that its operations were subject to robust, independent statutory oversight by IPCO (p. 15).
This strategy backfired drastically (p. 15). In February 2023, IPCO inspectors reviewed Agent X’s physical case file and issued a highly critical draft inspection report (p. 15). The inspectors independently concluded that MI5’s records strongly suggested NCND had, in fact, been blown wide open by the media team in 2020 (p. 15).
By this point, Officer 3 had transferred out of communications and into the specific MI5 department responsible for managing relations with IPCO (p. 16), a move that screams of a deliberate attempt, on the part of Officer 3’s superiors, to maintain the cover-up. Once again, he assumed a gatekeeper role (p. 16). On 13 October 2023, MI5 sent a formal written rebuttal to IPCO, aggressively denying that any disclosure had occurred (p. 16). Unconvinced, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, Sir Brian Leveson, issued an ultimatum on 5 December 2023, giving MI5 exactly seven days to provide concrete evidence supporting their claims (pp. 15-16).
On 7 December 2023, an internal meeting took place inside MI5 to finalise the agency’s response (p. 16). It was attended by Officer 3, the case controller (Officer 4), and the Operational Security Advisor (Officer 23) (p. 16). Officer 4 was entirely candid, stating “absolutely clearly” that the handling team knew NCND had been abandoned in 2020, colourfully observing that “that horse had bolted” (pp. 16, 19).
Officer 3 reacted by aggressively suppressing the case officers (pp. 16, 19). He made an unyielding, categorical statement that the disclosure “did not happen” (p. 16). Officer 4 later testified to the inquiry that he felt systematically “put back in his box” by Officer 3 (p. 16). Having silenced internal dissent, Officer 3 drafted a final response to IPCO on 13 December 2023, reiterating the false narrative (p. 16). Weeks later, on 20 December 2023, Witness A filed another formal CLOSED statement before the IPT, heavily relying on the falsified IPCO response (p. 16).
The multi-year cover-up achieved its temporary climax on 21 June 2024 (p. 16). Misled by MI5’s coordinated structural testimony, the IPT issued a major judgment praising MI5 for “maintaining NCND throughout”, subsequently denying Beth’s legal application to compel disclosure of Agent X’s status (p. 16).
Total Exposure and the Goldring Findings
Recognising that the British courts had been completely manipulated into issuing judgments based on a fabrication, Daniel De Simone and the BBC decided to intervene (p. 16). On 18 November 2024, the BBC formally notified MI5 that its statements to the High Court and the IPT were completely false (p. 16). On 13 December 2024, BBC legal representatives forced MI5 officials to sit down and listen to the audio recordings of Officer 2’s original 2020 calls (pp. 16-17).
Faced with undeniable audio proof of institutional perjury, MI5’s legal position collapsed (pp. 17-18). In February 2025, the High Court stripped away portions of the injunction, heavily criticising the agency and demanding an immediate explanation for the deployment of false evidence (p. 17). MI5 initially attempted to manage the damage via an internal review and an independent assessment by Sir Jonathan Jones KC (p. 17). These early reviews extraordinarily concluded that Officer 2 had merely “forgotten” his actions due to pandemic-related stress, and that there was no “deliberate attempt” by MI5 to mislead the courts (p. 17).
This defensive shield shattered entirely when the BBC released further audio recordings of the later calls (p. 17). These tapes proved Officer 2 had not only compromised Agent X, but had systematically confirmed or denied the identities of multiple other intelligence assets (pp. 13, 17). In June 2025, the Divisional Court slammed MI5’s internal investigations as profoundly “deficient” and premature, ordering a comprehensive independent inquiry under the auspices of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner (p. 18).
Sir John Goldring’s resulting July 2026 report delivered devastating conclusions (pp. 1, 18):
- Officer 2 deliberately fabricated his account: “Officer 2 throughout knew he had departed from NCND. His lies formed the foundation of MI5’s false account” (p. 18).
- Officer 3 was heavily culpable for reinforcing the cover-up: He repeatedly misrepresented statements, actively suppressed clear warnings from operational handlers, and “shut down” case officers to protect the lie (p. 19).
- Witness A and the regional handling section shared significant responsibility for overstating facts under oath and failing to log vital data (p. 19).
- MI5 completely violated its statutory Duty of Candour (pp. 18-19). The service failed to explain this fundamental legal obligation to its corporate witnesses or any officers providing evidence to the courts (p. 19).
Conclusion: The Extent of Director General Ken McCallum’s Responsibility
To evaluate the extent to which the Director General of MI5, Sir Ken McCallum, is personally and corporately responsible for this institutional disaster, a clear distinction can be made between direct operational awareness and systemic executive accountability (pp. 9, 12). This is the effective judgement of the Goldring report: that DG Sir Ken McCallum held systemic corporate accountability, and that there was a statutory failure of Duty of Candour. By contrast, the report mainly blames the more junior officers:
- Officer 2 (Comms Head) for foundational lies and an unauthorised departure from NCND.
- Officer 3 (Comms successor) for suppression of internal warnings and misrepresentation to the watchdogs and IPT.
Direct Operational Responsibility
The Goldring report states that it establishes that McCallum did not possess initial operational knowledge of the June 2020 disclosure (p. 12). Officer 2 and the regional handling team allegedly bypassed the executive office, failing to seek the mandatory authorisation required from the DG or DDG before abandoning NCND (pp. 12, 18).
Furthermore, because the communications team and the regional handlers allegedly deliberately omitted these details from internal contact logs and the CHIS file, the executive office was functionally insulated from the reality of the calls during the initial 2022 High Court injunction phase (pp. 13, 19).
Systemic and Corporate Culpability
However, under long-standing principles of public agency governance and the strict statutory terms of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), McCallum bears severe corporate and institutional responsibility for the multi-year deception (p. 19):
- Failure to Enforce Executive Authorisation: Officer 2 operated as the head of an elite, sensitive department within MI5 (p. 23). The fact that a senior director felt empowered to unilaterally abandon a cornerstone doctrine like NCND, without seeking the Director General’s sign-off, demonstrates a profound breakdown in basic executive discipline and operational command (pp. 12, 18).
- Structural Failures in the Duty of Candour: Sir John Goldring explicitly found that MI5 systematically failed to instruct its corporate witnesses on the legal Duty of Candour (p. 19). As the administrative head of the service, McCallum is directly responsible for ensuring that the agency’s legal apparatus operates lawfully. Allowing senior intelligence officials to submit sworn evidence to the High Court and the IPT without defining their legal obligations to provide the complete truth represents a severe top-down regulatory failure (p. 19).
- The Culture of Suppression: The report highlights how easily internal dissent was crushed within MI5 (p. 16). When operational officers (such as Officer 4 and Officer 23) attempted to ring the alarm bells in December 2023, stating that the agency was lying to the courts, a mid-level bureaucrat (Officer 3) successfully silenced them (pp. 16, 19). This indicates a defensive, siloed corporate culture where protecting a historic state narrative routinely took priority over factual accuracy, statutory compliance, or the protection of domestic abuse victims (pp. 12, 16).
- Deficient Initial Investigations: When the lie was first exposed by the BBC late in 2024, MI5’s immediate internal response was to draft a highly defensive whitewash (pp. 16-17). The agency’s initial internal probe sought to minimise the crisis by claiming the foundational lies were merely a consequence of “forgetfulness” and stress (p. 17). These internal investigations were so aggressively managed and “deficient” that the Divisional Court actively rejected them as totally unfit for purpose (p. 18). McCallum is directly accountable for the integrity of his agency’s internal disciplinary and investigative review processes.
Ultimately, Sir John Goldring acknowledges that since the total exposure of the scandal, McCallum has “readily acknowledged” the gravity of the crisis and initiated a major structural reform programme under the Director General Strategy to prevent a recurrence (pp. 7, 20). In other words, once he knew the game was up, admissions could be made. Nevertheless, as the ultimate corporate custodian of MI5, Ken McCallum remains fundamentally responsible for presiding over an institutional culture that permitted systematic deception, suppressed internal truth-tellers, and subverted the administration of British justice for over four years (pp. 7, 16, 18).
We can go further. All MI5 officers who are engaged in undercover work are required to lie in order to maintain their cover. Is there always a strict line between the ‘operational need’ to lie and honesty in public service? Ken McCallum is open that he used lies in his role running agents inside Irish Republican organisations. As he said in 2021 in an interview with the Sunday World:
- “I mean if I went into a room to meet a member of the IRA, in their eyes, I’m probably their sworn enemy. So it’s a professional challenge.
- “I mean how do you find that one thing that gives you a connection to that other human being to persuade them to do the right thing and work with us? It’s a risk.
- “It can be sport. It often is. I mean as far as Northern Ireland is concerned, I’ve supported every team in Glasgow,” said McCallum
In the end, the question here is about more than the structural failings and institutional corruption in the Security Service. It is also a matter of how high up the corruption goes. Amongst the findings of the report reviewed above was the case of Witness A, who apparently had no previous knowledge of the events and within a short time was himself contributing to the cover-up. This was no middling member of staff; he was a Deputy Director, which is a rank in the Senior Civil Service at SCS1. This is only three rungs away from the Director General (at SCS4). If reflexive involvement in cover-up and corruption stretches so high in MI5, questions surely need to be asked about whether they stretch further.
The report itself does not suggest it has asked to see internal files on discussion of Agent X with the DG or his senior aides. It says that McCallum had no “operational knowledge”. Without making such checks on any knowledge, whether “operational” or not, the jury must still be out on whether, or to what extent, Ken McCallum is personally implicated in this scandal.